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Abstract 
‘On a widely shared assumption, our mental states supervene on our microphysical 
properties – that is, microphysical supervenience is true. When this thesis is combined with 
the apparent truism that human persons have proper parts, a grave difficulty arises: what 
prevents some of these proper parts from being themselves thinkers as well? How can I 
know that I am a human persons and not a smaller thinker enclosed in a human person? 
Most solutions to this puzzle make radical, if not absurd, claims. Recently, however, 
Michael Burke and Howard Robinson proposed conservative solutions that, according to 
them, do not have such undesired consequences. This paper argues that the conservative 
solutions tacitly assume at least one of the radical ones, and therefore they provide no 
alternative to the extreme solutions.’ 
 
The apparent truism that human persons have proper parts seems to lead to a paradox.2 It is 
true of at least some of our parts that we would count them as thinkers if they were not parts 
of a larger thinking being. But then, it is difficult to tell why they are not thinkers in their own 
right. It is certainly desirable to avoid this seeming consequence, for it would imply that we 
share our thoughts with a multitude of thinkers under our skin. Nonetheless, it has proved to 
be embarrassingly difficult not to draw this moral without sacrificing some very strong 
intuitions; most philosophers who want to preserve the ‘one thinker to a place’ principle are 
forced either to give up on the idea that consciousness is both an intrinsic and microphysically 
supervenient property, or to commit themselves to revisionary theories about composition or 
identity. Recently, however, Michael Burke (1997, 2003) and Howard Robinson (2006) have 
suggested that denying the existence of the many thinkers has none of these consequences, 
and offered moderate solutions to the problem. This paper argues that these solutions fail. 
Section 1 generates the paradox as a consequence of nine independently plausible 
premises and differentiates it from similar metaphysical puzzles. Section 2 briefly surveys 
two current radical solutions on the market. It lies beyond the scope of this paper to argue for 
or against any of these solutions. Sections 3 and 4 examine Burke’s and Robinson’s 
conservative solutions respectively. I will argue that these solutions can remain coherent only 
at the cost of collapsing into some of the radical accounts. Again, it is not my goal to refute 
these accounts. Much of what Burke and Robinson say may very well be on the right track; 
they are just not alternatives to the old solutions – or so I shall argue. 
 
 
1. Articulating the problem 
Consider the following scenario: an ordinary human person John loses his left index finger at 
time t1. The resulting entity at a later time t2 consists of the parts that composed John at t1 save 
the parts of the left index finger; call this resulting entity Little John. (It seems highly 
                                                 
1 Penultimate draft; please do not cite without permission. 
2 y is a proper part of x iff every part of y is also a part of x but not vice versa. Unlike the more 
widespread definition according to which y is a proper part of x iff y is a part of x but is not identical to 
x, this one does not beg the question against relative identity. A relative identity theorist may want to 
say that a thing and its proper part can be identical under some sortal (this is why premise (9) will not 
be redundant in section 1.) 
 1
plausible that John persists as Little John, but this need not be presupposed to generate the 
paradox.) John had numerous macroscopic parts at t1: head, left leg, right arm, heart etc. He 
also had some parts for which we have no name, like the one consisting of all and only the 
parts of John, save his left index finger, as he was at t1 – his left index finger complement, to 
use a widespread technical term. Call this almost John-sized entity John Minus.3 
John Minus at t1 consists of all and only the parts that make up Little John at t2. 
Furthermore, these parts are arranged in the same way in John Minus and in Little John. 
Perhaps this cannot be carried out on the current level technology; as a result of the 
mutilation, Little John will have a wound on his hand that John Minus did not. But this 
difference seems irrelevant, so let me stipulate that John Minus and Little John are 
microphysically identical. 
In that case, we face a problem. Little John is obviously conscious; some people are 
known to have consciously undergone the loss of their fingers. But if Little John is conscious, 
then John Minus ought to be conscious as well. He is qualitatively identical to Little John 
down to the last particle, and if consciousness supervenes on the microphysical, then any 
duplicate of a conscious thing is also conscious. But John Minus cannot be conscious, for he 
is part of something, namely John, that is also conscious. It would be absurd to hold that there 
is a plethora of conscious beings where we thought there was only one. Thus we are 
confronted with the paradox that has come to be known as the Many Thinkers Problem. For 
ease of exposition, I formulate the paradox as a consequence of nine independently plausible 
assumptions4: 
 
(1) John exists 
(2) John is conscious 
(3) John Minus (a large proper part of John) exists 
(4) Little John exists 
(5) Little John is conscious 
(6) Little John is microphysically identical to John Minus 
(7) Consciousness is an intrinsic property 
(8) Intrinsic properties are nomically supervenient on microphysical 
properties 
 
From (1)–(8): (C1) John Minus is conscious 
 
(9) John is not identical to John Minus 
 
From (C1) and (9): (C2) There are at least two thinkers where John is 
 
Because there are infinitely many large parts of John akin to John Minus (like John’s right 
thumb complement, his left ear complement etc.), the argument generalizes to 
 
                                                 
3 To keep things simple, I will work with the three-dimensionalist version of the puzzle and will 
presuppose a temporally indexed theory of parthood. As we shall immediately see, these assumptions 
are metaphysically innocuous, since the Many Thinkers problem (unlike Geach’s similar problem of 
the 1001 cats) is not a problem about persistence. With little effort, the paradox could be rephrased in 
terms of spatiotemporal parts. 
4 From now on – again, for the sake of simplicity – I will omit the time-indices. Throughout the whole 
paper, ‘John Minus’ will name an entity at t1 and ‘Little John’ an entity at t2. As already indicated, I 
wish to leave it open whether John persists as Little John at t2. 
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(C3) There are many thinkers where John is 
 
I find all the premises quite plausible, and I assume that other people are not very different 
from me in this regard. Partly for this reason, and partly for the sake of clarity I am going to 
use the terms ‘radical’ and ‘conservative’ in a somewhat stipulative manner: solutions that 
embrace the conclusion or reject at least one of the premises (or their modified versions – see 
subsection 4.1) will be counted as radical, while solutions that deny that the conclusion 
follows I will call conservative. 
A note is in order here. Although the problem presented above bears some superficial 
resemblance to more familiar metaphysical puzzles, it is not to be confused with them. First, 
the Many Thinkers Problem is obviously not the same as Unger’s Problem of the Many, a 
paradox about how to determine the boundaries of a physical object if there are many particles 
in its vicinity that are neither determinately parts of, nor determinately not parts of the object 
in question (Unger 1980). Apparently, we do not only not know what those boundaries are, but 
we also have to subscribe to a multitude of overlapping objects with slightly different 
composing matter. However, the Many Thinkers Problem has nothing to do with vagueness 
and indeterminacy: we would face it even if all objects had perfectly sharp boundaries. 
Second, the puzzle has to be distinguished from problems resulting from spatiotemporally 
coincident thinking objects belonging to different sorts but composed by the same matter 
(Olson 2003). The Many Thinkers Problem has nothing to do with sorts and is faced by any 
sane materialist ontology of human persons. Third, the problem is not the same as Geach’s 
Problem of the 1001 Cats (Geach 1980: 215). That is a problem about the identity conditions 
and modal fragility of material objects. The worry posed by the Many Thinkers Problem is of 
a different kind: it is not about whether either of John and John Minus survive John’s 
mutilation. It is about whether John Minus was a thinker before the mutilation. 
That being said, some of the available solutions to the Many Thinkers Problem are 
familiar from the literature on the aforementioned topics. This is because although these 
problems are not the same, they are disturbing for similar reasons: in spite of how desperately 
we want to avoid thinking beings that are coincident or to a great extent overlapping with us, 
their existence seems to be an inescapable consequence of some of our very ordinary beliefs. 
No wonder that some of their solutions also apply to the Many Thinkers Problem. 
 
 
2. Microphysical supervenience and intrinsicness 
In order to find a way out of this paradox, either at least one of the premises has to be 
rejected, or it must be shown that they do not entail the embarrassing conclusion. Since the 
goal of this paper is not to assess the radical solutions but to find out whether they have 
existing alternatives, I will not go into details about them. It is enough for the reader of this 
paper to know that they all deny at least one of the premises.5 However, I will make an 
exception for those solutions that deny either premise (7) or (8). Advocates of these solutions 
                                                 
5 There are at least two ways to reject (4): compositional nihilists like Unger (1980) and Dorr and 
Rosen (2002) deny that there are composite material objects, while Chisholm (1976) seriously 
considers (but does not straightforwardly endorse) the option that persons are elementary particles. 
Some philosophers (van Inwagen 1981; Olson 1995) reject the existence of ‘arbitrary undetached 
parts’ and, as a result, premise (3). ‘Minimalists’ who identify persons with brains (Hudson 2001: Ch. 
4, 2007; Dainton 2008: 227–235) reject premise (2). Relative identity theorists like Geach (1980) 
claim that, since identity is a sortal-relative concept, premise (9) is in an important sense false. And 
last but not least, Lewis (1999) simply accepts the conclusion and argues that since we do not count 
persons by strict numerical identity, we ought to learn to live with the many thinkers. 
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argue that consciousness is not an intrinsic property or that intrinsic properties do not 
supervene on the microphysical. What justifies this special treatment is that my main 
argument against Robinson’s account will trade upon the claim that he cannot consistently 
keep both premises. 
What is the exact claim in question? Trenton Merricks (1998) urges that because we have 
good reasons to accept the other premises, we ought to reject the following supervenience 
thesis in order to avoid the many thinkers: 
 
Microphysical Supervenience (MicSup): Necessarily, if atoms A1 through 
An compose an object that exemplifies intrinsic qualitative properties Ql 
through Qn then atoms like Al through An (in all their respective intrinsic 
qualitative properties), related to one another by all the same restricted 
atom-to-atom relations as A1 through An, compose an object that 
exemplifies Q1 through Qn. (Merricks 1998: 59) 
 
Once MicSup is denied, we can consistently say that John is conscious but John Minus is not. 
Although Little John is conscious and he does not differ in his microphysical properties from 
John Minus, it does not follow that John Minus is also conscious. Consciousness does not 
supervene on the microphysical, so they can differ in this important respect even if they do 
not differ in their microphysical properties. 
Some philosophers, however, arrived at the contrary conclusion: since we have all reasons 
to stick to MicSup, we would better say that the property of being conscious is not an instance 
of it, for consciousness is extrinsic – that is, premise (7) is false. 
While there are many possible definitions of ’intrinsic’, it seems fair to use the one that 
has been endorsed by a main advocate of the extrinsicness solution. Theodore Sider (2001) 
adopts this definition of intrinsicness from David Lewis: let us call any two objects duplicates 
iff all their parts have the same natural properties and stand in the same natural relations to 
each other. A property is intrinsic iff it can never differ between any pair of possible 
duplicates, whether in the same or different possible worlds.6 
Not every possible duplicate of Little John is conscious; for example, John Minus is 
arguably not. Therefore, consciousness is not an intrinsic property on Lewis’s account. 
According to Sider, being conscious is one of those extrinsic properties that are also maximal. 
Roughly, a property F is maximal iff large parts of an F cannot themselves be Fs (Sider 2001, 
2003). For instance, being a house is a maximal property: the window-complement in my 
house fails to be a house because it is a proper part of something that is a house. Similarly, 
being conscious is also a maximal property: although John Minus has everything intrinsically 
required to be conscious (he is conscious* in Sider’s terminology), he fails to be conscious 
precisely because he is part of something larger that is also conscious. By this reasoning, 
maximality theorists can preserve the idea of microphysical supervenience by rejecting 
premise (7). 
 
 
3. Burke’s solution 
Without argument, I assume that none of the above solutions is very appealing. Both premise 
(7) and (8) have strong intuitive force. Could we do better? Some philosophers say we could. 
                                                 
6 Lewis (1986: 59–69). ’Natural’ is an undefined primitive in Lewis’s account. This is often taken to 
be rather a virtue than a vice, for it makes the account neutral with respect to which properties are 
natural. 
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Michael Burke and Howard Robinson advocate conservative solutions that seem not to 
commit them to curious metaphysical theses.7 Their accounts are different in important 
respects, but both aim to resolve the paradox without sacrificing significant intuitions. Put 
more formally, they believe that all the premises (1)–(9) are true but (C3) does not follow 
from them, because the word ‘conscious’ occurs equivocally in the argument. 
 
 
3.1. Burkean conservativism 
Burke, just like Sider, appeals to the notion of maximality, but he does not bind it to 
extrinsicness.8 Instead he argues that there are important respects in which John and John 
Minus are different – important enough that they account for the fact that John Minus is not 
conscious in any significant sense. The most important differences for the present discussion 
are these: 
 
1. John’s self-referential statements refer to John, but John Minus’s do not refer to John 
Minus. If John Minus is conscious, then he is systematically wrong about the referent of his I-
statements. 
2. If John Minus is conscious, then he is immediately aware of some sensations occurring 
outside his body. On the other hand, John is aware of sensations only in the ordinary way. 
Similarly, if John Minus is conscious, then he has direct and voluntary control over some 
parts which do not belong to him. Another related fact about John is that he has differential 
concern for John over John Minus. But then, because he has the very same mental states, John 
Minus also has differential concern for John over himself. 
3. The attribution of mental states helps predict John’s behaviour. On the other hand, 
attributing mental states to John Minus does not enhance our ability to predict John Minus’s 
behaviour. At best, it would help predict someone else’s (John’s) behaviour. 
 
These reasons tell against attributing consciousness to proper parts of John. Their 
behaviour is not coherent and rational enough to make it explanatorily fruitful to attribute 
conscious states to them. However, Burke adds that although John is conscious and John 
Minus is not, this is not to be understood as a huge difference that needs much explanation. 
John Minus is not conscious, but that does not mean that he is devoid of consciousness: there 
is consciousness in him. While John is a genuine subject, John Minus is a mere container of 
consciousness, but he is not conscious. So there is only one thinker in the story, John. 
 
 
3.2. The trouble with Burke’s account 
On the face of it, Burke’s solution is plausible and elegant: only John is a person, and his parts 
are mere thought-containers. This is how we ordinarily treat human persons and their proper 
parts. On reflection, however, the question still presses itself: What makes John Minus 
incapable of undergoing the mental states he contains? Why is he not an experiencer? If being 
a subject of consciousness means anything more than merely containing it, this distinction 
ought to be explained. And recall, Little John is microphysically identical to John Minus. 
                                                 
7 Robinson is a Berkelyan idealist and thus denies (8), so he does not in fact endorse the view. Instead 
he offers it for materialist philosophers as a possible solution to various puzzles about coincident and 
overlapping thinkers (see his 2006: 255–8). 
8 In his 1997, Burke is not explicit about whether it follows from the fact that personhood is a maximal 
concept that consciousness is not intrinsic. However, in his 2003 (123, footnote 10) it becomes clear 
that he wishes to defend his account without conceding that consciousness is an extrinsic property. 
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It will not do to argue that because of the reasons laid down in 1–3., we should not 
attribute conscious states to John Minus. We know from the beginning that the attribution of 
conscious states to him leads to absurdities. But in section 1, an argument has been presented 
to the effect that in spite of all that, John Minus is conscious. Merely pointing out some of its 
further odd consequences does not refute this argument. Which premise is false? If none, why 
should we believe that the conclusion does not follow? Burke does not say. 
So the question remains: why is John Minus only a container of consciousness? What 
makes him incapable of undergoing the states it contains? Either being a subject is intrinsic, 
or it is not. If it is not, then Burke’s account denies premise (7). It is hard to see how 
consciousness could be intrinsic if the property of being a subject is not. And if it is intrinsic, 
then there will be a difference between Little John and John Minus that is not microphysically 
underpinned – that is, the theory turns out to deny premise (8). Hence, Burke’s account is 
either wrong or not conservative. 
 
 
4. Robinson’s offer 
In veins similar to Burke’s distinction between subjects and containers, Robinson draws the 
line between having thoughts and merely hosting them. This position is notably different from 
Burke’s, taking into consideration Robinson’s analogy with the relation between hardwares 
and computer programs: persons are related to their bodies as softwares are to their 
underlying hardwares. According to the view on offer, neither the object we initially 
identified with John nor any of its proper parts is a thinker. Although a person is wholly 
physical, it is not a physical object but a physical process, constituted by (but not identical to) 
a series of mental states. 
Here is how Robinson’s account – or the Process View, as I am going to refer to it – is 
supposed to solve the Many Thinkers Problem. While the part-whole relationship between 
John Minus and John turned out to be the source of embarrassing puzzles, the relation 
between the corresponding processes is quite unproblematic. John and John Minus have the 
same mental properties, so they are the same process. That is, by the John Minus process and 
by the John process we simply pick up the same person. The paradox disappears. 
One might think that this solution itself is radical enough. If persons are not objects but 
processes, then there are many things that cannot really happen to them. To begin with, 
persons cannot change their properties. While it involves changes, a process itself cannot 
change. Neither do persons have ordinary physical properties such as height and weight. 
Attributing properties like that to processes would be a category mistake. To sum up, even if 
the process talk did save all of our initial intuitions, it would probably threat some other ones. 
However, this is not my main worry. 
 
 
4.1. Problems with the Process View 
I am afraid that Robinson’s solution is not immune from the problems which beset the old 
ones. The part-whole puzzle about objects can be rephrased in terms of processes. Apparently 
there is nothing that precludes processes from having shorter subprocesses. For instance, let 
us assume that John, a person consisting of mental states S1,...,Sn, comes into existence at time 
t0 and terminates at tn. Processes are not indivisible: he has a subprocess consisting of states 
S1,...,Sn-1 that spans from t0 to tn-1 (call it Short John), and this subprocess has everything 
intrinsically required to be conscious. Short John, however, cannot be identified with John, 
simply because they differ in their properties; Short John lasts shorter. Now, John could have 
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been instantaneously annihilated just at the moment at which Short John terminates – let us 
call this short-living counterpart Dying John.9 In the counterfactual case, Dying John would 
surely be conscious. But Short John is not, or at least this is what we are inclined to say. What 
grounds the difference? 
Before proceeding, let me first state the modified premises in lines with the Process View: 
  
(1’) Series S1,...,Sn constitutes a thinker 
(2’) The thinker constituted by series S1,...,Sn is conscious 
(3’) Series S1,...,Sn-1 exists 
(4’) Series S1,...,Sn-1 would constitute a person if it were not succeeded by Sn 
(5’) The person that series S1,...,Sn-1 would constitute would be conscious 
(6’) If series S1,...,Sn-1 constituted a person, this series would be microphysically 
indistinguishable from series S1,...,Sn-1 as it actually is 
(7’) Consciousness is an intrinsic property 
(8’) Intrinsic properties are nomically supervenient on microphysical properties 
(9’) Series S1,...,Sn-1 is not identical with series S1,...,Sn 
 
Therefore, 
  
(C’) There are at least two thinkers where John is. 
 
Robinson seeks to avoid C’ by claiming that from its negligible microphysical difference 
with S1,…,Sn it does not follows that series S1,…,Sn-1 also constitutes a thinker: at best, it 
constitutes a host. Hosts are not thinkers, so the problem goes away. 
But this is not much of an improvement. For Robinson has nothing to say about why is 
Short John only a host and not a thinker. At this point, we seem to be left with the old 
solutions, or their relevantly modified versions: either Dying John mentally differs from Short 
John despite their microphysical identity because microphysical supervenience is false, or 
consciousness is not an intrinsic property and as such should not be expected to supervene on 
the microphysical. Either way, the distinction between process hosts and process subjects will 
not stand without the rejection of at least one of the (modified) premises (1’)–(9’). 
 
 
4.2. A reply: the liberal concept of constitution 
As we have seen, the spatial problem of the many thinkers reappears as a temporal one for the 
Process View. Something must account for the fact that S1,…,Sn-1 constitutes a thinker but 
S1,…,Sn-1 constitutes only a host. But we do not want to deny any of premises (1’)–(9’). How 
could the Process View be saved? 
In discussion, Robinson argued that in order to avoid the many thinkers, the process 
theorist is not compelled to deny any of the premises. It can be conceded that series S1,...,Sn-1 
constitutes a thinker even if it is succeeded by Sn; it merely has to be added that this thinker is 
                                                 
9 The term ‘counterpart’ is intended to be neutral here, and is just a loose and convenient way of 
expressing that there could have been a being like Dying John. I am not concerned with whether John 
could have been Dying John, and if so, whether the relation between them would be strict identity or 
counterpart relation. We have earlier seen that the Many Thinkers problem is not one about 
persistence; now it can be added that it is not a problem about identity across possible worlds either. 
(However, this modified version is a problem about the persistence of processes. While there is a 
lively debate between three- and four-dimensionalist accounts of the persistence of objects, I take the 
view that processes are temporally extended and have temporal parts to be fairly uncontroversial.) 
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simply John, who also has Sn. To ensure that there be a thinker who is more short-lived than 
John it would be required that there be a series S1,...,Sn-1 which constitutes a thinker that has 
no mental states other than S1,...,Sn-1 (from now on, I will call this relation ‘exhaustive 
constitution’). However, this is a concession Robinson is not forced to make. 
This is the point where, in my opinion, the Process View showcases its main advantages 
over the other views. The object theorist cannot make this move, for composition is an 
exhaustive concept: the locution ‘the xs compose object O’ implies that, if all the xs are 
atomic, there is no part y such that y is part of O but has none of the xs as parts. This does not 
hold for mental states: mental states can constitute a thinker without exhaustively constituting 
it. This way Robinson can avoid the process version of the Many Thinkers Problem; from 
premises (1’)–(8’) it does not follow that any series not having Sn is conscious, which makes 
(9’) harmless too. Such an inference would be invalid, because on the Process View persons 
are not identical with series of mental states but are only constituted by them, whatever this 
exactly means. Since constitution need not be exhaustive, there is nothing wrong with the idea 
that series S1,...,Sn-1 constitutes a person – it constitutes John himself. If the Process Theorist 
is allowed to make use of this liberal, non-exhaustive understanding of constitution, she 
seems to have provided a conservative solution to the Many Thinkers Problem. 
 
 
4.3. Why the liberal conception does not solve the problem 
However promising this proposal may seem at first sight, it cannot stand as it was stated 
above. Let me start with the – presumably uncontroversial – claim that process persons still 
ought to satisfy a supervenience principle analogous to MicSup, something like the following: 
 
Microphysical Supervenience for Processes (MicPro): Necessarily, if 
states S1 through Sn constitute a process that exemplifies intrinsic qualitative 
properties Ql through Qn, then states like Sl through Sn (in all their 
respective intrinsic qualitative properties), related to one another by all the 
same restricted state-to-state relations as S1 through Sn, constitute a process 
that exemplifies Q1 through Qn. 
 
Now, whereas the object theorist cannot say that John is the only person composed by A1 
through An-1, Robinson can say that it is John (the process) that is constituted by S1 through 
Sn-1 (although he is not constituted only by them). Unfortunately, closer examination reveals 
that  MicPro implies that John does not have the same intrinsic qualitative properties as 
Dying John. 
How can we show this? One might think that the prospects of the anti-Robinsonian are 
quite dim. For suppose that Dying John is constituted by states S1,...,Sn-1 and exemplifies 
properties Q1,...,Qn-1. Presumably, if John can be constituted by states S1,...,Sn-1 without being 
constituted only by them, then nothing precludes him of having properties Q1,...,Qn-1 while 
also having some other properties. Thus John and its temporal parts seem to confine to 
MicPro. No problem so far. 
At this point, however, Robinson’s main weapon can be turned against himself. Let us 
assume that John is constituted by states S1,...,Sn-1 (sic!) and has intrinsic qualitative 
properties Q1,...,Qn.10 However, Dying John is also constituted by S1,...,Sn-1, though he has no 
                                                 
10 Since Robinson takes ‘being constituted by certain states’ to be a non-exhaustive relation, it is 
correct to say that John, who also has Sn, is constituted by S1,...,Sn-1. This is perfectly compatible with 
his also being constituted by S1,…,Sn. 
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further states. The worry is that Dying John does not exemplify properties Q1,...,Qn, for some 
of these properties are supervenient upon states of John that Dying John does not have. So 
there is a case to which  MicPro does not apply, which commits Robinson to a rejection of 
the process version of microphysical supervenience. This makes the account radical. 
Robinson might resort to a weaker supervenience thesis that is not violated by denying 
that the series S1,...,Sn-1 exhaustively constitutes a thinker. Such a thesis would hold 
something like this: 
 
Weak Supervenience of Processes (WeakPro): Necessarily, if states S1 
through Sn exhaustively constitute a process that exemplifies intrinsic 
qualitative properties Ql through Qn, then series like Sl through Sn (in all 
their respective intrinsic qualitative properties), related to one another by all 
the same restricted state-to-state relations as S1 through Sn, constitute a 
process that exemplifies Q1 through Qn. 
 
The word ‘exhaustively’ in the antecedent makes WeakPro immune to John / Dying John-
style counterexamples. Although series S1,...,Sn-1 does constitute John, from this we cannot 
infer that Dying John exemplifies the same intrinsic qualitative properties because series 
S1,...,Sn-1 does not exhaustively constitute John. On the other hand, these states exhaustively 
constitute Dying John, and it is valid to infer from this that John has all the intrinsic 
qualitative properties that Dying John has. 
However, this supervenience thesis is odd, if not incoherent. According to WeakPro, a 
thinker’s qualitative intrinsic properties supervene on its states only if those states 
exhaustively constitute the thinker. But constituting a thinker exhaustively is a patently 
extrinsic property of those states: it depends on whether they are followed by some further 
states. How could intrinsic properties of states supervene on such extrinsic features as their 
being succeeded by other states? Whether some property supervenes on certain states ought 
not to depend on the presence of other states.11 Of course this rule applies only to intrinsic 
properties, but being a thinker – unless Robinson is willing to reject premise (7’), which 
would make his account radical again – is surely to be treated as intrinsic. 
The process theorist may reply that from the fact that a property P supervenes on an 
extrinsic property Q it does not follow that P itself is also extrinsic. For instance, being male 
supervenes on having an Y chromosome and being at least 3000 km far from the North Pole. 
Technically speaking, it really does: it is true that when there is difference in maleness, there 
must be a difference in having an Y chromosome and being at least 3000 km far from the 
North Pole. Yet the subvenient property is clearly gerrymandered and extrinsic, while 
maleness is arguably intrinsic. So, Robinson could argue, the conclusion that he is committed 
to the extrinsicness of thinkerhood due to taking ’being exhaustively constituted…’ as the 
subvenient base is rather hasty. 
This objection has no grip on my argument. Whenever a property Q supervenes on 
property P, it trivially supervenes also on any conjunctive property that has P as a conjunct. 
In such cases, however, the conjunctions could be pared down to their necessary conjuncts in 
order to get the minimal supervenience basis. But I know of no other way in which intrinsic 
properties could supervene on extrinsic properties, and this method will certainly not work 
for being exhaustively constituted. ’Being exhaustively constituted’ is equivalent to ’being 
                                                 
11 This does not contradict any kind of holism about the mental. If a mental state is partly determined 
by other mental states, it simply follows that it does not supervene on the subject’s intrinsic qualitative 
features at a certain time. 
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constituted and not followed by’. And although ’being constituted’ is intrinsic, it has already 
been shown to be insufficient as the subvenient base for being a thinker. This shows that 
thinkerhood comes out as extrinsic, in the end. 
The moral of this section is the following. If Robinson’s account is correct,  MicPro 
cannot be true because Little John and John satisfy its antecedent without satisfying its 
consequent. And the weaker WeakPro poses an intractable dilemma: either the principle has 
the absurd consequence that some intrinsic properties of a process supervene on its extrinsic 
properties, or it classifies thinkerhood as an extrinsic property – a consequence Robinson 
cannot afford if he wants his solution to remain conservative. I conclude that the Process 
View offers no alternative to the radical views. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
While it would be nice to have a conservative solution to the Many Thinkers Problem, nobody 
to date has offered a convincing one. Burke’s and Robinson’s solutions depend on unclarified 
claims, and once they are worked out in detail, they are bound to collapse into the radical 
ones. It is illegitimate for Burke to distinguish between thinkers and thought containers unless 
he wants to deny either the intrinsicness of consciousness or the supervenience of intrinsic 
properties on the microphysical. Robinson’s process-based solution is not better off either: it 
can account for not regarding temporal parts of person-processes also persons only at the cost 
of rejecting at least one powerful intuition. He could avoid this problem by resorting to a 
more liberal understanding of constitution. In that case, however, he faces a dilemma: either 
he must admit that consciousness violates any plausible thesis of microphysical 
supervenience, or he has to accept a weaker thesis that compels him to treat ‘being conscious’ 
as extrinsic. The upshot is that Burke’s and Robinson’s solutions offer no alternative to the 
extreme ones but presuppose some of them.12 
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